The curious case of Poland's political self-harm
On Tuesday 19 January, The European Parliament (EP) held a debate on the state of democracy and the rule of law in Poland, less than a week after the country become the first EU member state to be subjected to an Article 7 procedure. This will see the European Commission make a preliminary assessment of whether the recent emasculation of the constitutional tribunal, and moves to monopolize influence over public media, constitute a "serious and persistent" breach of EU values.
News of the probe prompted many to ask whether the Law and Justice (PiS) government elected last October overplayed its hand: did Kaczynski & Co think they would get away with no more than a friendly slap on the cheek, similar to the one that Hungarian president Viktor Orbán received from Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker at the Eastern Partnership Summit last spring? Or did the EU overreact, potentially alienating some of the Poles who have misgivings about their new government, and raising questions about the legitimacy of Brussels' role as a democracy watchdog?
Don't trust the PolesAlthough sanctions against Poland remain unlikely, the magnitude of the crisis has taken Poles and the country's foreign observers by surprise. Everyone braced themselves for a difficult spell in Poland's relations with Europe, after the national-conservatives won 38 per cent of the vote, allowing them to govern alone – a first in Poland's post-communist history. However, few were prepared to see a conservative government with a mandate from less than a fifth of the electorate – turnout figures are dismally low in Poland – steamroll a number of nigh-revolutionary reforms that, according to many, fundamentally challenge the state's democratic order. Although some dismiss these accusations as premature and others point to pervasive politicization of public institutions in the past, the extent and speed with which PiS is implementing its programme mark a drastic regression.
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The state we live inYet, embarrassment and self-doubt are not the core issue here. For a country that's been through as much history as Poland, where the nominal per capita GDP hovers around two-thirds of that of Greece, and with many Poles continuously seeking a better life abroad, the difference between national pride and shame is a familiar thin line. Many are deeply worried about Poland losing international clout, but ultimately what matters more is the question of what kind of a country we Poles want to live in, and how we come to that agreement as a democratic polity. So far, the government maintains that it has done no more than implement the will of the people and protect Poland's true interests: majorities reign, they say, and national interests sometimes trump the rule of law.
But there is no evidence that a majority of Poles approve of the government's bold moves – nor that most readily accept the illiberal turn toward majoritarian politics that dismiss minority positions as a nuisance and see the law as a mere constraint. Many Poles voted for PiS because they were swayed by an election campaign focused on social justice (whatever happened to Poland's Left, you asked?), or were disgusted with scandals that engulfed Civic Platform (PO) governments. Indeed, the glossy image of a "green isle" Poland that fared exceptionally well through the economic crisis, and that many associate with a PO narrative, does not sit comfortably with many Poles, and not just PiS voters. Yet the political marketplace has offered few alternatives: in Poland, social justice comes with an ultra-conservative social values agenda.
In a country where the president and prime minister stand accused of fronting for PiS' chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski, many are now left wondering what the party's ultimate goal is: power as an end in itself or a means to realizing a vision of a country transformed, and if so, what sort of Poland lies ahead? Several thousand have come out onto the streets to protest across many cities in recent weeks. Die-hard supporters remain loyal, while some less-decisive voters seem resigned to sit on the fence and "give PiS a chance". So how does the EU's concern for Poland's democracy fit with all this?
Solidarity or a besieged fortress?The PiS government has not taken kindly to foreign criticism, with some of its leading figures lashing out at EU bureaucrats and (mostly Brussels-based German) politicians with tasteless quips that recall Poland's past experiences with foreign "supervision" – and unwittingly trivialize the Poles' historical traumas. There may be good reasons to question the wisdom of the Commission's decision, especially since it is likely to expose its own powerlessness in the process. And indeed, the more outlandish polemic coming from some EP politicians may be counterproductive. But although caution in lecturing the Poles is advisable, the fear that foreign meddling could backfire is overstated.
To start with, domestic dissent by the "worst sort of Poles" – as Kaczynski refers to the protesters – in and of itself derails PiS' "besieged fortress" defence. Secondly, Poles remain staunchly pro-European; given their level of trust in the Brussels bureaucracy is higher than that in the domestic political elite, the current stand-off is unlikely to turn them away. And finally, Poles are more confident today than they were during PiS' first stab at governing in the mid-2000s, shortly after Poland joined the EU, but had already gained an unfavourable reputation of an enfant terrible through the Iraq war and the constitutional treaty debacles. The fact that Poland has proven itself a constructive integrationist during the PO's tenure in power can now help shield patriotic sensibilities when confronted with foreign criticism.
Although a show of EU concern for developments in Poland can do no harm, ultimately the fate of the country's democracy is for Poles themselves to sort out. Luckily, crises often come with opportunities. The silver-lining here is that Poland's PiS challenge is stirring a new political awakening, which should not only shake up the range of options on Poland's political map, but also mobilize greater participation among Poles, ensuring that future governments are elected by larger shares of the electorate. The current experience must leave Polish democracy more robust and its institutions fortified. More than twenty-five years since we won our freedom, we face a real test of our democratic credentials as a people.
Original in English
First published in Visegrad Insight, 20 January 2016
Contributed by Res Publica Nowa
© Stefan Szwed