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Not being able to stop
Richard Nixon's Vietnam policy as a paradigm for the Cold War
English summary
Why do states risk waging war, even though the actors know from the outset that the expected costs will exceed the benefits? Why do heads of state insist on seeking to decide conflicts with the use of force, against the counsel of their military and foreign policy advisors? What lies behind the inability or unwillingness to use exit options? These questions appear especially relevant with respect to the "hot wars" that took place within the Cold War; they are addressed in this essay, which explores the conduct of the Vietnam War under Richard M. Nixon's administration. Nixon himself later conceded that the better course of action would have been to withdraw US troops from Vietnam at the beginning of his presidency. Instead, he continued to wage war for five more years, sacrificing twenty-five thousand more US soldiers and tens of thousand of Vietnamese lives. The terms of the peace agreement ultimately signed differed only marginally from proposals made in 1968. This analysis of Nixon's administration yields insights and arguments that promise to be of value beyond the Vietnam War case study and that mark an interface between historiography and the diagnosis of contemporary developments.
Published 2006-01-03
Original in German
First published in Mittelweg 36 6/2005
Contributed by Mittelweg 36
© Bernd Greiner/Mittelweg 36
© Eurozine
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