Thomas Schreiber
Harry Forster
Eurozine
Le monde diplomatique
Le monde diplomatique
2004-05-18
New Europe and the United States
The American Dream of Europe
Ten new states joined the European Union on 1 May. This is a
historic moment for the United States, which has been promoting
enlargement for years, convinced it will increase US influence.
With political crisis in Poland and deadlock in Cyprus, such
hopes are ill-founded.
The United States intends to take full advantage of its
relations with 10 new member-states that joined the European
Union on 1 May. Pentagon hawks - particularly the US Defence
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's trusted adviser, Richard Perle,
who resigned his seat on the defence policy board in February
so that he would not hinder President George Bush's
re-election campaign - believe that the US must aggressively
defend its worldview against "old Europe". They also believe
that EU enlargement will enable the US to get a majority of
countries on its side to prevent the EU becoming a real rival
See Perle's, An end to evil: how to win the war on
terror, Random House, New York, co-authored with David Frum.. According to US foreign policy guru, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, US power may be at its peak but its political
position in the world has reached an all-time low See "Pour une nouvelle stratégie américaine de paix et de
sécurité" in Politique étrangčre, n° 3/4, 2003..
This is why, as the majority of the former communist
countries of central and eastern Europe join the EU, the US
is trying to consolidate its position in Europe, particularly
in the east. Contrary to the claims of certain analysts, this
region has lost none of its strategic importance despite the
end of the totalitarian regimes. Recent developments are
another step in Washington's long-term strategy, which has
been unchanged since the end of the second world war,
regardless of party allegiance. Successive administrations
have simply made minor adjustments.
Careful analysis of annual reports on US national security
strategy since 1947 makes its foreign policy objectives in
the communist world perfectly clear. It also highlights the
divergence between propaganda and reality. Although the US
denounced Moscow's unilateral interpretation of the Yalta
agreements, it gradually reconciled itself to Soviet control
over eastern Europe. This was apparent in the vocabulary of
successive reports. In 1947 there was still talk of
containing communism. By the early 1950s the focus was
shifting to the idea of rollback through peculiar funding of
anticommunist émigré organisations in the US and the launch
of Radio Free Europe, essential to the battle for hearts and
minds. However, the memoirs of US leaders reveal that in 1956
(the Soviet intervention in Hungary), 1968 (the crushing of
the Prague spring) and 1981 (the state of emergency in
Poland) the US had no intention of going further than formal
protests. From 1956 the language of US diplomacy referred to
peaceful engagement and bridge-building between East and West
See Bennet Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: the United
States and Europe, New York University Press, New York, 1991,
quoted by Ignac Romsics, Volt egyszer egy rendszervaltas,
Rubicon Könyvek, Budapest, 2003..
In the 1960s Washington even discouraged the activities of
some anticommunist organisations thought to be too
aggressive. There was no longer any question of liberating
captive countries. The catchword was differentiation between
communist countries. The US watched with interest as
President de Gaulle of France developed his policy of
détente, understanding and cooperation. In the early 1970s
the Ostpolitik of Germany's prime minister, Willy Brandt,
seemed even more promising. During the Nixon administration
(1969-74) and the reign of Henry Kissinger, Washington
improved its own policy of détente towards eastern bloc
countries; the first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(Salt) was concluded and there was a significant improvement
in bilateral relations between the US and some members of the
Warsaw Pact. Washington paid far more attention to the state
of its relations with Moscow than the internal policies of
future partners, particularly their record on human rights.
Nixon, imitating de Gaulle, began by taking an interest in
Romania, under the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu: Nixon
appreciated his efforts to develop an independent foreign
policy. Romania had taken liberties with the official line
dictated by Moscow: recognition of the Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany), neutrality in the Sino-Soviet
conflict, continuation of diplomatic relations with Israel
after the Six Day war (1967), refusal to take part in the
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. But it was also one of
the most repressive regimes in the communist bloc. With US
backing, Romania was nevertheless the first Warsaw Pact
country to become a member of the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank (1972). In 1975 the US granted it
most-favoured-nation trading status.
In Poland and Hungary the regimes showed signs of
liberalisation, but foreign policy obeyed the Moscow line.
Many students and researchers won scholarships to travel to
the US under the Ford and Fulbright programmes, becoming
proud holders of passports, an impossible dream for most
people in the eastern bloc, including Romania.
In August 1975 there was a summit meeting in Helsinki of
representatives of Canada, the US and all European countries
except Albania. But President Gerald Ford, who had taken over
from Nixon after he was forced to resign over Watergate,
clearly had little understanding of international affairs.
The Europeans emphasised human rights issues but the
Americans seemed resigned to accepting the status quo. During
his 1976 election campaign Ford even referred to Poland and
Romania as sovereign and independent states.
Things changed when Jimmy Carter arrived in the White House.
Brzezinski, Carter's top adviser, was of Polish extraction
and advocated a more dynamic policy. Without going so far as
to destabilise communist regimes he suggested encouraging all
forms of protest. Support for dissident intellectuals was
reflected in an increasing number of invitations to the US
and new importance for pressure groups such as Helsinki Watch
and Amnesty International. NGOs lavishly funded by the US
administration closely watched human rights performance in
communist countries.
The US also made extensive use of Radio Free Europe as a
showcase for its new policy, designed to contribute to the
peaceful transformation of existing regimes rather than their
overthrow. At the time no one in the US imagined the Soviet
bloc would collapse. Even the most optimistic Moscow-gazers
only hoped that satellite countries would gradually gain
greater independence.
When Ronald Reagan was elected president the psychological
war speeded up. In 1983 the then US vice- president George
Bush Snr visited Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary; Washington
announced the setting up of the National Endowment for
Democracy. With financial backing from the Republican and
Democratic parties, the State Department and the CIA, it
supported political parties, trade unions, newspapers,
publishers and groups promoting democratic ideas. Its beneficaries included Solidarnosc in Poland and publishers of
samizdat works in Hungary.
None of the regimes subject to this unwanted interference
banned the organisations. They had already started falling
apart. The process speeded up in 1989. The US kept a close
eye on events. In July 1989 Bush Snr, now president,
travelled to Poland and Hungary. He later explained that the
Soviet regime was afraid that the only purpose of the trip
was to encourage unrest, even if not deliberately. In fact
Bush Snr shared some of the Soviet concerns. According to the
national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, the US acted as
midwife at a time of peaceful but tense transition with
eastern Europe moving from autocracy to pluralism See George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed,
Knopf, New York, 1998..
In 1989 the great powers met for their annual summit in
Paris, marking the bicentenary of the French Revolution. Bush
Snr focused debate on eastern Europe and pushed for a large
aid programme to help Poland and Hungary. But he was careful
not to upset the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, under
pressure at home from hard- liners opposed to liberalisation
in Poland and Hungary. Polish and Hungarian Americans, some
of whom occupied key posts in US administration or business,
clearly influenced Bush Snr. In September pressure from these
lobbies led Congress to vote the Support for East European
Democracy (Seed) Act, allocating $1.2bn aid to Poland and
Hungary over three years. Although officially still under
communist rule, the two countries became close partners of
the US.
The Baltic lobby felt Bush Snr was being too careful. It did
not want to wait for the gradual liberalisation of communist
regimes and demanded immediate independence for Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia. The US had never recognised their
annexation by the Soviet Union in 1939 and had maintained
diplomatic relations with them. Their representatives exerted
pressure on the 34 signatories of the 1975 Helsinki Agreement
on human rights to be admitted as independent states to the
Paris summit in November 1990 that marked the end of the cold
war. France's outright refusal and US confusion defeated
this. It was still too soon to imagine the end of the Soviet
Union. The focus of international attention was shifting
towards the Persian Gulf, where there were plans to liberate
Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion.
Not until June 1991, after Slovenia and Croatia had declared
their independence and Yugoslavia plunged into civil war, did
the US take an interest in the Balkans. Observing the failure
of Franco-British attempts at mediation with a certain
satisfaction, the US prepared its political and military
entrance under the guidance of President Bill Clinton's
special envoy, Richard Holbrooke See the interview with Holbrooke in Politique
internationale, no 72, 1996.. At the same time the US
administration launched a new policy to encourage democracy
in former communist countries in eastern Europe, through
Nato, which these countries wanted to join, rather than
through European institutions. This explains the failure of a
French project to establish a European Confederation
presented in Prague in June 1991. Poles, Hungarians and
Czechs talked of Europe, but they dreamed of the US.
The US Senate's unilateral lifting of the embargo on arms
sales to Bosnia-Herzegovina in July 1995 was the start of US
engagement in the conflict. The Croatian offensive began in
August (prepared and armed by US "civilians"), followed by
the bombing of Serb positions around Sarajevo by Nato
aircraft. In November the US airbase at Dayton, Ohio, was the
venue for a peace conference. US negotiators ousted their
European counterparts; this was the beginning of their active
involvement in central and eastern Europe and the end of
fighting in Bosnia.
Powerless European diplomats watched this invasion See Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: a Memoir,
Miramax Books, New York, 2003.
orchestrated by Brzezinski and Holbrooke, then by the US
secretary of state, Madeleine Albright. These specialists on
the other Europe worked tirelessly to consolidate US
leadership in the east. The US had already decided, without
consulting its partners, that the first to benefit from Nato
enlargement would be Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic:
the US imposed its choice at the Nato summit in Madrid in
July 1997. This was mostly the result of powerful Polish and
Hungarian lobbies in the US and Albright's Czech origins, but
the countries also represented attractive markets for US
arms sales, given the imminent replacement of obsolete Soviet
equipment.
The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo made it clear that the US was
using Nato to achieve its hegemonic aims. But strengthening
its economic grip on central and eastern European countries
also works, particularly in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
Since 1991 several thousand Americans of Baltic extraction
have returned home; the most gifted have quickly risen to
important positions in the administration, armed forces or
business, offering the US their unconditional support.
After the attacks of 11 September 2001 US ambitions became
stronger See Pascal Boniface, La France contre l'Empire, Robert
Laffont, Paris, 2003. . The National Security Strategy document of 2002
says: "While the US will constantly strive to enlist the
support of the international community, we will not hesitate
to act alone if necessary, to exercise our right of
self-defence by acting preemptively against such terrorists."
The main focus of the document is the fight against terrorism
but it also applies to the defence of all the strategic,
political and economic interests of the US hyperpower See Christian Saint-Etienne (preface by France's former
foreign secretary Hubert Védrine), La puissance ou la mort,
Seuil, Paris, 2003.
.
Bilateralism has replaced multilateralism in US relations
with its allies. A country's admission to Nato is used to
establish closer links. This was notably the case at the
Prague summit in November 2002, where the agenda included the
second enlargement of the organisation, welcoming Romania and
Bulgaria, who saw this as the first step towards joining the
EU. In 2001 the three Baltic republics had signed agreements
with the US, opening the way for extensive military
cooperation. All the former Eastern Bloc countries clung to
the illusion that they could become full allies with the US,
on paper and in practice, a belief reflected in the
unswerving support for Washington over Iraq long before the
start of hostilities.
On 30 January 2003, at the height of the Franco-American
standoff, eight European countries, including the
beneficiaries of the first Nato enlargement, Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic, published a letter supporting the US.
On 5 February Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia followed.
They have all applied to join Nato See Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2003; Le Monde, 7, 8
and 27 February 2003; and also Pascale Boniface and Christian
Saint-Etienne, op cit.
. All the signatories
were aware that the "Letter of 10" was devised by US lobbyist
and Pentagon consultant Bruce Jackson; 13 prospective EU
member states demonstrated their preference for the US,
reflecting the influence Washington had gained in eastern
Europe over a decade.
But it would be a mistake to suppose that eastern Europe is a
homogeneous bloc of unconditionally pro-US states. When asked
why he had signed the letter, Hungary's prime minister, Peter
Medgyessy, explained: "If I hadn't signed the letter I would
have been accused of refusing transatlantic solidarity." "The
letter was a trap?" asked a journalist. "Exactly," Medgyessy
replied Libération, 19 February 2003.
.
On 17 February 2003, in the middle of an extraordinary
European Council summit meeting in Brussels, the French
president, Jacques Chirac, criticised countries that "had
missed an excellent opportunity to hold their tongues". His
words prompted protest in eastern Europe. Even his closest
allies thought Chirac should have rephrased his criticism to
avoid upsetting those who, quite legitimately, differed in
opinion. It is generally assumed that Chirac's prime target
was Poland, which had just decided to buy F-16 fighters from
the US rather than its European competitor. But he also
wanted to draw attention to the contradiction between support
for the US and the draft European constitution. Article I-15
stipulates that: "Member states shall actively and
unreservedly support the union's common foreign and security
policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall
comply with the acts adopted by the union in this area. They
shall refrain from action contrary to the union's interests
or likely to impair its effectiveness" Le Monde, 19 February 2003.
.
The Iraq conflict began a few weeks later. From the start
public opinion in eastern Europe was reluctant or openly
hostile to any military engagement there See Catherine Samary, "Old and new Europe against war",
Le Monde diplomatique, English language edition, November
2003.
. In response to
US calls for assist ance the eastern European governments
decided, after some debate, to dispatch only small
contingents and those mainly non-combatants. The only
exception was Poland, which emerged as a regional power and a
key strategic ally of the US in eastern Europe See Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, "America's
protégé in the East? The emergence of Poland as a regional
leader", International Affairs, no 79, December 2003.
. It sent
several thousand soldiers to Iraq, where they were rewarded
with command over the south-central region (between US and
British troops). This is a fine reversal of roles for a
country so often humiliated by powerful neighbours east and
west; rather than being occupied, the Poles are occupiers in
Iraq.
Initially the eastern European states involved in Iraq were
optimistic about the rewards of their participation. They all
hoped for a share in reconstruction and the benefits of the
transfer eastwards of former US bases in Germany. When the US
Air Force relocated military bases in Romania and Bulgaria in
2003, the move generated tens of millions of dollars. There
was talk of the imminent arrival of many US troops and their
families near Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian towns, with the
prospect of greater security and riches.
Unfortunately the true picture was not so rosy. The US
certainly intends to move some of its bases in Germany
further eastwards, but it also plans to reduce the number of
its troops after modernisation "All Ready on the Eastern Front", Time Magazine, 19
January 2004.. Of the 120,000 currently
stationed in Europe, almost a third will be sent home. This
reorganisation, which will last several years, aims to deploy
troops quickly and directly from the US in a crisis. US
planners also want to move closer to potential hot spots in
the Middle East or Central Asia, but also to the Caucasus and
to Georgia, its new key partner.
Colin Powell has confirmed that Washington wants to set up
several temporary bases. The Russians are lukewarm about
this; the defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, explained: "It
is understandable for bases to be located in Bulgaria or
Romania, in the way of possible terrorists, but in Poland and
the Baltic states it makes no sense" Le Figaro, 7 March 2004.
. Eastern Europe
will certainly receive a steady flow of US civilian and
military personalities lauding the benefits of close
relations with Washington. Millions of dollars in aid are on
offer to allies wishing to modernise their armed forces,
providing they buy hardware in the US. Nor should we forget
the Bush administration's incentives for US firms building
strategic motorways across the Balkans.
But the task of these missionaries will not be easy. A year
after the fall of Saddam even the keenest advocates of US
policy are losing heart. Attacks by the Iraqi resistance have
hit eastern European contingents; the case for war based on
weapons of mass destruction is in tatters. Attempts at
peaceful transition have failed, undermining US credibility
in public opinion and even in the organs of state.
Neo-conservatives in Washington were delighted when Serbia
announced that it was sending 700-800 soldiers to Iraq, but
that was before the Madrid bombings. During her last visit to
Belgrade, the US undersecretary of state, Cathleen Stevens,
spoke of Washington's interest in plans to reform the Serbian
army.
The more complicated the post war situation in Iraq, the more
the thoughts of eastern European politicians turn to Europe's
role. Countries that joined on 1 May and those who will join
later are beginning to realise how important old Europe is
for their future See Catherine Samary, op cit.
. If the US remains a close ally, it
would compete directly with the rest of Europe.