Samuel Abraham
Samuel Abraham, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs
eurozine
Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs (SFPA) Fall 2001
2002-08-12
The End of Illiberal Democracy in Slovakia?
An Analysis of the 1998 Election
As Slovakia is about to go to the polls in September, Samuel Abraham looks back at the pivotal elections of 1998. These elections, Abraham argues, signalled an end to the era of the "illiberal democracy" under Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. But what has the current government learned from these elections and how well has it fulfilled its mandate?
The 1998 election has been widely perceived as turning point of Slovakia's post-communist history. After the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, it seemed that Slovakia was rapidly drifting towards becoming an authoritarian regime under the leadership of the Prime Minister,
Vladimir Meciar. Fortunately and a bit surprisingly it did not and the reasons for this development are complex and manifold. In this paper it will be argued that the fall of illiberal democracy after the September 1998 elections was not an incidental event. It was the result of a shift in the overall political culture in a society that had overwhelmingly rejected
populist and nationalist policies and rhetoric; the democratic heritage that, although much damaged and
distorted, survived somehow in the historical memory
and allowed for the emergence of a civil society. The popularity of the populist leaders that had been so
dominant since a few months after November 1989 fell
dramatically because the overall conditions in society,
and thus political culture too, had altered. After nine
years of a difficult and turbulent post-communist
transformation period, dominated by populist and nationalist governments and the break-up of
Czechoslovakia, the outcome of the September 1998 elections resulted in the majority of the
population and the new government both being genuinely for democratic reforms. Slovakia
again aspired to become a serious NATO and EU candidate. What is even more significant is that
the shift was generated from within society assisted by free private media, the non-governmental
organizations and international pressure and happened, as will be explained, only partially due
to the activities of the democratic opposition politicians who took power after these seminal
elections.
There is no singular explanation to account for this momentous change in a society that was
for so long considered to be dangerously swayed by a nationalist and populist elite. In general,
we can state that the defeat of illiberal democracy in Slovakia in 1998 was due to the combined
effect of long-term factors such as the history, political culture and legacy of the Communist regime, and short-term factors such as contingencies of post-communist transformation and
international pressure exerted on Meciar's regime. The important mobilization effect stimulating
the civil society and altering dominant political culture in Slovakia, came from the free printed
and electronic media and, just prior to the elections, the non-governmental organizations, and
civic associations. Other factors were: general dissatisfaction with the gradual international isolation
of Slovakia, and the fear of being left out of transatlantic Western institutions.
In this paper, first we will describe the concept of illiberal democracy as the key tool used for
the analysis of the period prior to 1998. Second, we will outline the role of free media considered
here as the crucial component in the process of change of political culture that took place during
this period. Third, considering illegal acts, breaching the Slovak Constitution prior to 1998 elections,
we will ponder over a poignant question as to what held back Meciar from establishing an outright
authoritarian regime. Fourth, we will assess the role of the political opposition that after the election
formed the government. I will argue that it did not and could not play a very active role in the
whole revival of civil society before 1998. It was intimidated, marginalized and squeezed out of
state media by the populist-nationalist government coalition. The above factors will allow us to
explain the reason for the fall of illiberal democracy in Slovakia in 1998. Finally, we will briefly
discuss the action of the democratic government that came to power after the 1998 election. Its
current action, or lack of it, the future prospects, reflects the conditions set in 1998.
Rise of Illiberal democracy
Following the collapse of Communist regimes in 1989 in Central Europe, ultimate political
authority rested not with self-appointed communist leaders but with the voters. Thus it is not
surprising that the policies and conditions in various of these post-communist countries reflect
their particular history, tradition, and religion as well as recent political developments. People are
free to govern themselves, to participate in the political process and choose governments as
they deem appropriate. There is no outside pressure to deny this choice. Yet, there is nothing to
prevent them from choosing badly. And there is no one to blame for it but the electorate. Yet, for
someone nursed on liberal-democratic doctrine any blame of the electorate is not only
undemocratic but sounds like sacrilege.
This paradox is the central theme of "The Rise of Illiberal Democracies", an article written by
Fareed Zakaria.F. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracies", Foreign Affairs (November/December 1997).
He stresses the difference between liberalism and democracy, which may be
well known to specialists in western political theory, but it has been too easily forgotten in many
contemporary discussions about how best to promote and consolidate democracy. The two
terms are today often taken together but in fact have distinct histories and distinct meanings. His
characterization of the difference is aptly captured by his observation that, "constitutional liberalism
is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use".Zakaria, ibid., p. 30.
Zakaria draws this
distinction in order to make a broader observation about contemporary political life. "Today", he
says, "the two strands of liberal-democracy, interwoven in the western political fabric, are coming
apart in the rest of the world". In a growing number of countries, "democracy is flourishing,
constitutional-liberalism is not". Increasingly, Zakaria argues, free and competitive elections are
producing a new breed of illiberal democracy.
Zakaria presents a minimalist understanding of democracy as "the rule of the people". According to him, it is simply a method of selecting governments through mass plebiscite and
free and fair electoral procedures, which, in the modern world, have become synonymous with
competitive, multiparty elections. Zakaria, ibid., p. 23.
Understood as a procedure, democracy offers little information
and still less certainty about the character and content of the government, which emerges from
this process. Reviewing the experience of the 20th century, Zakaria observes that democratic
elections have frequently produced illiberal and sometimes even non-democratic leaders. Hitler
and President Fujimori in Peru are but a few of the examples he mentions. Zakaria, ibid., p. 23.This reminds us that
democracy alone can provide no firm guarantee of a just and decent society, nor for any definitive
protection against continued tyrannical abuse. For this sort of protection, we must look not to
democracy but to liberalism.
Liberalism, as Zakaria further explains, "...is not about the procedures for selecting governments,
but rather government's goals. It refers to the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to
protect an individual's autonomy and liberty against coercion, whatever the source - state, church,
or society". Zakaria, ibid., p. 25. In the western tradition, the protection of individual political, civic, and economic
liberties has engendered a specifically constitutional form of liberalism, the principle features of
which are: the rule of law, equality under the law, impartial courts, checks and balances on
power, and the separation of church and state. According to Zakaria,
" ...constitutional liberalism
is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use." Zakaria, ibid., p. 30.
Zakaria's analysis offers several important lessons. First, it serves to disabuse democratic
advocates, both East and West, of the simplistic assumption that all good things necessarily
come with democracy. Or that for the creation of a "civil society", democracy is the only necessary
condition. It is not a sufficient one. Here, Zakaria offers a sober warning:Zakaria, ibid., p. 25.
Democracy is only one public virtue, not the only one. ...Democracy without
constitutional-liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion
of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war.
Finally, Zakaria's discussion also makes it abundantly clear that any politician who would
seek to acquire power through electoral manipulation, political bribery, and constitutional sleight of-
hand is not only illiberal, but also not even a democrat.
For the purpose of explaining the rise and fall of Meciar in Slovakia, his sudden emergence in
1990 and his subsequent defeat in 1998, the "illiberal democracy" theory seems the most suitable.
Zakaria's theory provides a framework that allows us to incorporate and link together the long term
and short-term causes that influenced developments during this period. Let us now analyze
the concrete factors that brought about the change in 1998.
The Role of Free Media and NGOs
There are two possible explanations why a society rejects illiberal democracy: one is a matter
of efficacy; another, of principles. The first scenario is that a corrupt and arrogant leadership, due
to its exercise of power, is perceived as being too politically and economically overtaxing and
damaging to the well being of society. The operational radius of populists and nationalists - to stir
emotions, arouse nationalistic pride, search for and mob an internal enemy and to condition the
society as being under constant threat - becomes less potent in comparison to the economic
hardship and international marginalization of such a society. Thus the society, pragmatically
calculating the pros and cons of such a political compact, rejects illiberal democracy as an
inefficient political entity. This aspect certainly played a role and there were some Slovaks who
had previously supported Meciar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) but
subsequently started to see him simply as a liability to their own welfare. However, there is an
argument contrary to such a purely pragmatic and instrumental scenario explaining why the vast
majority of Slovaks rejected Meciar in September 1998. Surprisingly, to many observers, the
Slovak economy after 1993 did not deteriorate as expected. On the contrary, the economic
performance even improved in the 1995 - 1996 period, and it was not until 1998 that it plummeted
- even then it remained within reasonable limits. The reason for this was a combination of the
following factors: very tight monetary policies by the Slovak Central Bank, heavy state borrowing,
and a relatively good base inherited from the "Czechoslovak era".
The second reason for a society rejecting a populist regime is that it refuses to tolerate its
government excesses and is no longer indifferent to the fate of its country and actively participates
in the regime's downfall. It seems that this was the predominant case of Slovakia a few years
after its independence. A country that was no longer either a part of larger ideological bloc, as
was the case during the Communist era, nor a political unit, as being part of Czechoslovakia,
became much more responsible for its own destiny. The population was free to support or
reject, without being prompted by outside pressure, liberal democracy. It could continue, as it
did for several years after 1993, tolerate an illiberal democracy or even an authoritarian regime
or it could fight to become a liberal democratic society. Perhaps for the first time in modern
history, Slovak citizens realized that it was only they themselves who would decide whether their
country was to be led by narrow-minded politicians or those who help Slovakia to be a freer,
prosperous society striving to become a genuine civil society. It could be that they became
aware that not forces from outside, but they themselves were to decide the fate of the future
Slovakia. This was certainly the most surprising, if indirect, development derived from the breakup
of Czechoslovakia. Indirect, because the main protagonists who fought against illiberal
democracy were those who also had fought against Meciar even before 1993 and who had
generally been against the split of Czechoslovakia.
What was the catalyst that mobilized public opinion and caused a strong enough outrage
among the majority of the population which led in 1998 to an extraordinary mobilization of civil
society being witnessed? Was it the case of the kidnapping of the then President Michal Kovac's
son and the cover up of its investigation that was very reminiscent of the performance of some
South American Junta regime? Or was it the Meciar government's repudiation in 1997 of a
referendum on the direct election of the President? The public must have been outraged that
after the opposition collected half a million signatures supporting the referendum, the Minister of
Interior simply terminated the referendum on technical reasons and refused to comply with the
subsequent Constitutional Court decision that his action had been unconstitutional. Or was the main reason the massive privatization of state property for a fraction of the real price among the
government coalition members and their cronies? It is difficult to pinpoint a particular case or
occasion that represented a watershed in the public perception of the true nature of Meciar's
government. One can assume that it was rather a synergic effect caused by several factors.
There is one aspect in the mobilization of civil society, hence rejecting illiberal democracy,
and that is the activities of free and private media in Slovakia. The relentless disclosure of the
excesses and abuses of power in the independent media
seems as important as the scandalous behaviour of the
government itself. Although under pressure, some media
more, some less preserved their freedom from the
governmentís manipulation and control. It could be
argued that without the brave work of the free media
the balance of the September 1998 election could have
been tipped in favour of populist and nationalist parties.
It must be said at the same time, that despite the
immense importance of the free media, it would have
been to no avail if society itself had not been receptive
enough and ready to stand up against the populist regime. The free media can induce and
compel the civil society, but it cannot create it. Free media has little chance of succeeding in a
society where the appeal of populism demagoguery and sirens of nationalism is stronger than
the voice of reason and common sense. There has been some free media in the former Yugoslavia
and Russia, and yet their appeals fell on deaf ears. There must be mutual reciprocity and support
between the free media and the majority political culture.
The profile of two media outlets in Slovakia, the daily SME and the television station Markiza will
demonstrate such mutual interdependence. Both were first supportive of Meciar and his policies,
but gradually distanced themselves and became the main target of government attacks against
free media. As a result of this harassment, Slovakia was designated by Freedom House, a prominent
international agency monitoring freedom of the media around the globe, as being a country with
"partially free media".See Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Charles Graybow (eds.) Nations in Transit 1999-2000: Civil Society, Democracy
and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (New York: Freedom House 2001); see p. 560 for
Freedom House rating since 1989 till 2000.
The state-run TV and Radio, after in 1994 being thoroughly purged of
anyone who was not actively pro-government, became a tool of political indoctrination. They
did not provide objective information about government operations. On the contrary, they spread
sheer propaganda in order to discredit political opposition, the President and the free media. See J. Fule "Media", Slovensko 1998-1999. Suhrnna sprava o stave spolocnosti (Bratislava: Institut pre verejne otazky 1999),
p. 508-608.
The most outspoken and also most harassed media in Slovakia was the daily SME. It was founded
after the Meciar government tried to change the editors of the SME predecessor SMENAduring
the early months of 1993 due to the paperís critical stance towards the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
A group of journalists, led by Karol Jezik, split from SMENA, and within a couple of weeks created
a new daily newspaper, SME.
Since its onset, Meciar's regime used various legal and semi-legal
methods to undermine its position, and ruin this newspaper. For example, it arranged that SME
could not print in a printing house that was privatized by people closely connected to HZDS.
The Editor-in-Chief, Jezik, was arrested and interrogated several times over published articles and
news reports criticizing the government. On several occasions, members of government, including
Meciar, sued the newspaper for libel and various damages - the courts, being independent of
executive power, did not accept the charges. In October 1997, the association of journalists and
publishers of the majority of dailies, again led by SME, managed to thwart the most serious threat
to free press. The government of Meciar tried to introduce a disproportionately high tax for the
daily newspapers that have any foreign shareholders.See J. Fule "Media", Slovakia 1997. A Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 1998), p.
623-624.
Considering that all free press had some
foreign co-ownership, the tax would ruin them.
The daily SME set the tone for almost all other newspapers that gradually, and mostly only
reluctantly, became critical towards the Meciar government. More than any other medium, SME
through its objective, critical and courageous work, was seminal in the period 1993-1998 in
convincing democratically minded individuals not to give up hope about the future of democracy
in Slovakia. Every government coalition misuse of power, every illegal and scandalous act was
reported and analyzed on the pages of this daily. SME was also instrumental in helping various
individuals, professional groups and NGOs in providing space for voicing their concerns, proclamations
and appeals to the public. In short, for all those years, SME was a medium whereby citizens could get
their encouragement, check their political location within the society and be aware that if they despair
in facing the policies of Meciar's regime they are not alone. In as much as a newspaper has influence,
SME truly had such a major impact that a passive, dissatisfied and despairing majority in 1997 - 1998
became a full blown active civil society that took the fate of its country in its hands.
The evolution and motivation of the other medium, TV Markiza, which also had great influence
in defeating Meciar's regime, was very different than that of SME. Its change of direction and
joining the opposition to Meciar was symptomatic for the whole of Slovak society during the
Meciar regime. It would not have received a licence to broadcast had its Slovak founders not been
close to HZDS and to Meciar himself. Indeed, Meciar had first hoped that in Markiza, there would
finally be a private medium friendly to his government. At the beginning, TV Markiza did not broadcast
any political programs and did not even provide a regular news service. It was commercially successful
thanks to popular TV series, but its earnings could not match NOVA, the remarkably successful
Czech TV channel which was the most financially successful station in post-communist central
Europe for its tabloid news and political reporting. Surely, Markiza wished to emulate its more
successful TV station. And to counterbalance the state run TV that was flagrantly a mouthpiece of
Meciar's regime might have been seen as a lucrative opportunity for a commercial television station.
Markiza owned its license for five years, and knew that Meciar's government could be troublesome
but would not shut down a private TV station. It thus launched in 1997 news broadcasts, political
debate programs and investigative journalism, a new phenomenon in Slovakia. There was evidently
public demand for such TV programs and, moreover, TV Markiza could benefit financially. Indeed,
it succeeded in capturing a very high share of TV audiences - state TV, considering its highly
unprofessional pro-government reporting, was no match for Markiza. So, although Markiza became
a mouthpiece for the opposition, it seems it was motivated more by commercial considerations
than by striving to support democracy in Slovakia, as was the case with SME. This rather cynical
calculation by the owners might have been based on their realization that the mood in society was
turning against Meciar, and being in opposition to him could bring financial benefit. In addition, TV
Markiza, feeling the strength of its influence, was instrumental in shaping developments within the
opposition political scheme.It has been suggested and widely publicised that the key political leaders emerging after the 1998 elections, the Prime
Minister of Slovakia, Mikulas Dzurinda, and the President, Rudolf Schuster, were promoted by the owner of TV Markiza.
Thus, although important in defeating Meciar's regime, TV Markiza
financially benefited from the already sprawling civil society that needed an independent source of
information regarding the government and the opposition.An additional argument that Markiza's decision to become oppositional for commercial reasons is that at the same time as it
was founded, another private TV station, VTV, received a licence. This TV station, from the beginning, explicitly supported
Meciar's government while its rating remained very low. Its operation was terminated in 1999 after it lost financial backing
from Meciar supporters.
Why Meciar did not Become an Autocrat
There is one nagging question why Meciar, facing electoral defeat in 1998, did not turn
Slovakia into an authoritarian regime and did not manipulate the elections. Why did he not
organize a coup when he had all the means and the potential to do so? Considering that during
his leadership the laws and the constitution were openly violated and the secret police used
criminal tactics to intimidate and even liquidate opponents, what prevented him - while being
alarmed by the opinion polls showing gradual decline of his popularity Zora Butorova (ed.) Democracy and Discontent in Slovakia: A Public Opinion Profile of a Country in Transition (Bratislava:
1997). - from moving one step
further and use force in order to remain in power for another four years? It might sound, in
retrospect, as an exaggerated argument, but considering the defiance of the Slovak Constitution
and thus the Rechtsstaat, such a move was feasible. On the other hand, one could argue that
Meciar, as a populist, was dependent on popular support, believing that what he was doing was
good for society and the majority must be convinced of his virtues. What was also possible was
that until the last moment before the election he believed that he could still win. Indeed, he did
everything short of using force to win the favour of the electorates - he redesigned electoral laws
that were to paralyze the opposition parties, led a smear campaign against the opposition leaders
in state TV and radio, and unsuccessfully attempted to close the popular TV station, Markiza. The
HZDS spent a much larger sum of funds on the electoral campaign than the law permitted, and
in January 1998 Meciar's electoral machinery spread the news - yet another time - that Meciar
was going to be assassinated. The tactics to spread the news about the alleged assassination dates back to 1991 and since then Meciar returned to this
scheme several times since. See Marian Lesko Meciar a Meciarizmus: politik bez skrupul, politika bez zabran (Bratislava:
VMV 1996). All this did not work, but it was not because of lack of effort by
Meciar and the HZDS. Flashy billboards and an evidently expensive campaign did not fool the
majority of Slovaks. On the contrary, it was counter-productive.
There is yet another line of argument considering Meciar's qua autocrat. He, as a leader in
Central Europe and not in the Balkans or somewhere in the former USSR, was not as ready to
defy democratic order as might be assumed from some of the deeds that took place during his
leadership. Frantisek Miklosko, a prominent Slovak politician who had known Meciar since 1990,
remarked that Meciar had several opportunities during his career to resort to radical, violent
solutions, especially when his popularity was as high as ninety percent. Yet he never did. He
never instigated open violence or called people to take to the streets and fight for him. Instead,
Meciar backed down, each time during a major crisis he disappeared from the scene for several
weeks "going to hunt bears", as his associates remarked sardonically.This is based on personal communication with Frantisek Miklosko who was one of the core VPN movement members and
the Chairman of the Slovak Parliament 1990-1992. Later he switched to the Christian Democratic Party and has been an
influential MP up to this date. In addition, despite his
frequent anti-Western rhetoric, he desperately and unsuccessfully sought the company of world
political leaders. Yet during the 1993-1998 period, he did not receive a single invitation from any
prominent Western leader. Several times he tried desperately to meet with the German Chancellor,
Helmut Kohl, or the US President, Bill Clinton, but without success. M. Lesko, ibid., p. 166.
Also, HZDS tried everything
to become a partner in an international political socialist or liberal grouping, again, without
success. The only people who were happily visiting Slovakia were extremist like Russian Vladimir
Zhirinovski, French Jean-Marie Le Pén or a number of leaders from former Yugoslavia.
It is not easy in Central Europe to be an autocrat, especially if one governs a small country
like Slovakia. More feasible is to create an illiberal democracy, which is more acceptable because
it fulfills the basic precondition of democracy yet, allows for almost unrestrained control and
power. International isolation, restrictions by neighbouring countries and the West, as well as the
little assistance an autocrat can obtain from fellow autocrats from the south or east, demonstrate
that a leader must pretend and follow the modicum of democratic rules. The Western countries
are in a dilemma while facing an illiberal democracy because it is easy to pinpoint the abuse of
democratic conduct, but much harder to point out a breach of the spirit of democracy - the
complex and delicate political arrangement that constitutes a liberal democracy. This is a paradox
explaining the prevalence of illiberal democracies throughout the world where individual countries
are unwilling or cannot stay isolated from international interaction, yet thanks to a degree of
democratic legitimacy, their leaders are free to act, more or less, as they wish. Thus the leaders of
various illiberal democracies pay lip service to democracy yet in many respects defy liberal
principles and norms. They allow democratic structure, manipulate but allow elections, and try
to avoid as much as possible the checks and balances of their rule. These unique features of
illiberal democracies make it a convenient political structure for numerous populists, nationalists
and fundamentalists and have become prevalent, both among some post-communist countries
and also throughout the world.
So it might be stated that Meciar did not become an autocrat after 1994 simply because it is
not easy to become one in a society that can be radicalized, but not to a degree that the necessary
zeal among the population can be held indefinitely. Additional factors were Slovakia's central
European location, international pressure, and Meciar's reluctance to create an authoritarian
country in 1998.
The Role of Democratic Opposition
It might be erroneously assumed that the main factor in defeating Meciar was the action of
his political opposition. In fact, that the opposition politicians did not become Meciar's principal
contenders was only partially their fault. There are several reasons why they remained rather
placid and defensive, especially between 1994-1997. Their main concern was to withstand
permanent censure and harassment by the government coalition. Thanks to this intimidation,
the opposition must have constantly fought for its sheer survival and thus did not have enough
energy for exercising standard opposition politics. They were effectively removed from all executive or legislative positions usually allocated for the opposition as well as from state TV
and Radio, through which they could have influence or expose the excesses of the Meciar
government.
Meciar's political opposition contained parties representing the whole left-right political
spectrum. There was the former Communist Party
(Party of a Democratic Left), Meciar's former allies
who left HZDS (Democratic Union), the Christian
Democratic Party (KDH), former members of Public
Against Violence (VPN) since 1996 grouped in the
Democratic Party, and finally the Hungarian parties.
Altogether these parties somehow reflected the leftright
division within the Slovak political scene, each
of them represented a different ideological position
and outlook and thus they were divided and
uncooperative. Meciar tried to keep the opposition divided and occasionally, when himself
in trouble within his own coalition, tried with some success to lure, especially, the former
communists into closer cooperation.
There were several unsuccessful attempts to unify the opposition, but it was only the
draconian election law that the governmental coalition passed in 1998 that forced the merger
of several parties. First, in 1997, three centrist and right parties formed the so-called "Blue
coalition" in order to create a stronger political subject. The Christian Democrats, the Democratic Union and the Democratic Party formed the "Blue coalition". Such a coalition was to guarantee
that the representatives of these parties would get to Parliament in the next elections. According to Slovak electoral law, each party must receive a minimum of five percent of votes in the election. The coalition of
two parties (seven percent) and coalition of three parties (nine percent). Any larger coalition must obtain at least eleven per cent.
Later on, in order to enhance its position, the "Blue coalition" accepted two small parties The Green Party and Social Democratic Party.
hoping to become, after the next election, the strongest political unit. The governmental
coalition, trying to undermine this expanded "Blue coalition", passed a law requiring that
each party in a coalition must attain at least five per cent of votes. See Peter Lebovic "Political Aspects of the Election Law Amendments", Butora,M.,MeseznikovG., Butorova·, Z, and
Fisher, S. (eds.) The 1998 Parliamentary Elections and Democratic Rebirth in Slovakia (Bratislava: Institut pre verejne otazky
1999), p. 43-44. So for example, if any
single party within the "Blue coalition" did not achieve these five per cent, regregardless of the
overall percentage of votes gained by the whole coalition, such a coalition would not enter
the Parliament. It would be disqualified and its votes were to be distributed among the other
parties entering Parliament. An illogical and undemocratic law aimed solely to enhance the
chances of the governmental coalition of winning the election. As a reaction to this law, the
five parties of the "Blue coalition", merged, with some reluctance, into one party, the Slovak
Democratic Coalition (SDK). The governmental coalition tried to disqualify even this merger
as artificial and calculated accusing SDK of still being a coalition and not a party. Well,
artificial and calculated - yes. But it was due to the draconian electoral law that aimed to
eliminate the main opposition parties. The appeal one month before the election to the
Supreme Court by HZDS to disqualify the SDK was repelled. Slovensko 1989-1999, p. 877.
Being under strong international
pressure, the governmental coalition was upheld, this time, by the Supreme Court.
The opposition democratic parties did not synchronize its steps while fighting Meciar until only
a few months before the election. Hence, they participated only marginally in the resurrection of
a civil society in Slovakia. Only in the Summer of 1998, did the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK),
former Communists (SDL) and the newly created Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) along with
the Hungarian Coalition, agreed that if victorious, they would cooperate and form a new
government. Recently came to light the activities of economy professor and public figure, Juraj Stern, who invited on several occasions
in the early 1998 the then opposition politicians to plan the common political strategy and the future coalition arrangements.
(Based on personal communication) During the period 1994-1998 the opposition was preoccupied by its own survival,
its parties often quarreling among themselves and being under constant threats by the populist and
nationalist government coalition. So, the opposition can be only partially blamed for its paralysis
and inability to participate in the activation of society. The fact remains that it did not act as the
catalyst for the emerging civil society. Only in 1998, sensing the defeat of Meciar, did the opposition
start to act together and cooperate, but by then the civil society was active and vibrant.
The Lesson of 1998
The "inaction" of the opposition politicians before 1998 electoral campaign had its
consequences after the elections when those four parties listed above formed a new
government. The new democratic government did not act as swiftly and as radically against
the previous government as the outraged population that defeated Meciar had expected. The
population, very much aware of its importance in defeating Meciar, expected much more
radical action after the elections than the government was able and willing to deliver. On the
one hand, the democratic opposition that took over the reigns of power from Meciar in 1998,
reestablished the rule of law and guaranteed liberal-democratic rights and freedoms in Slovakia,
and, in this respect, responded positively to the general atmosphere in Slovakia. On the other
hand, the democratic leaders did very little to act against those who before 1998 abused
political power and defied laws and the constitution, nor did they prosecute the main culprits
who privatized state property for a fraction of the real price. For more than two years after the
defeat of Meciar's government, not a single person was sentenced, and only a fragment of
embezzled property was recovered. Most of the fictitious contracts made at the last moment
to the benefit of Meciar's cronies before Meciar left office, mostly have been met or
compensated.
This was the unfortunate path for the health of democracy in Slovakia after 1998 where the
electorate that had voted Meciar out did not see the new government repair the damage left by
the previous administration. Instead of trying to work together and sustaining the trust of the
majority of the electorate, the new government has spent most of its energy quarrelling, thereby
creating political divisions. Before the election they were united against a common enemy, but
having won the election they lost their energy, vision and common purpose. Although the
government that came to power in 1998 was democratic and much different from its predecessors,
it simply did not act on the colossal task it faced after the end of illiberal democracy.
If the end of illiberal democracy is comparable to a revolutionary situation then it follows that
a revolutionary situation requires revolutionary action.By "revolutionary situation" we mean a major political overhaul of the structure of political governance.
What must be prevented is the maintenance
of any continuity of the previous regime's policies, and those who broke the law or undermined the
rule of law should be brought to justice. It is not enough simply to administer a liberal democratic
political structure. Those politicians and civil servants who breached the rule of law and committed
criminal acts during the rule of previous governments must be prosecuted. Otherwise, those illiberal
democrats that have been defeated, after the initial shock, may grasp the opportunity to criticize and
undermine the new liberal democratic government. Weak and inactive new governments are open
to the damage that might be visited upon by both the regime and the society. Furthermore, if the old
culprits are not punished accordingly, the blame for this damage will be laid on the shoulders of the
new government. And those who cause it will be the first to blame the new leadership.
The inability to act in the revolutionary political situation after the defeat of illiberal democracy
in Slovakia following the 1998 general election, has been a decisive general lesson for other
post-communist, or any other societies, that manage to defeat illiberal democracy. What the
democratic politicians did not or could not fight for, and received on a golden platter as a result
of the 1998 elections, as was argued in this paper, could endanger their future position and slow
the momentum in society that had brought down the illiberal democracy. It should also be
noted that while they obtained their position easily, they might just lose it easily.
The continuous low electoral preferences throughout 2000 and 2001 for the governmental
parties reflect the failure to act swiftly and decisively immediately after the 1998 election against
its political predecessors. All the positive results that the coalition undoubtedly achieved after
1998 in economic consolidation, foreign policy and restoration of liberal values in public life
have been counterbalanced by one colossal failure to act upon its mandate it received from the
electorate in 1998. The disillusioned electorate that previously supported the democratic coalition
either shuns politics or supports new opportunistic and populist parties. In addition, support of
Meciar's HZDS remains comparable to that of 1998 or around 25 percent. Thus the prospects
for the 2002 election remain uncertain.
One possibility is again a broad coalition against Meciar
but a resulting coalition would be even less stable than the current one. On the other hand, such
a coalition would have a good chance to guarantee Slovakia with NATO and EU membership.
Nevertheless, the result of the post 1998 government's inaction is not likely to end with the
return of illiberal democracy. This is thanks to the maturity and experience of the general public,
which demonstrated these qualities before the 1998 elections. In fact, it seems that the process
started in 1998 is not reversible - at least not to the extent that illiberal democracy could return
to Slovakia. Hence, the momentous change that Slovakia experienced in 1998 is a sign of positive
development, and the lack of action after 1998 should be only a temporary setback.
To conclude, it seems in retrospect that the political ordeal which Slovaks experienced during
the years following the break-up of Czechoslovakia, has been a worthwhile, if painful and costly
experience. Suffice it to say, the decisive factor of a societal shift in Slovakia came with the awareness
of responsibility among the majority of the population that they were the masters of their own fate
and future. However, it is a paradox that such awareness became possible only after the populists
and nationalists dragged Slovakia away from a community of democratic nations and close to the
brink of becoming an authoritarian regime. Resulting long but peaceful struggle transformed Slovak
society, culminating with the 1998 elections and the overthrow of the Meciar regime. The resurgence
of civil society, and the defiance of government action, especially during the period of 1997-1998,
is a remarkable story, a key moment in Slovak history. It was, however, a high price to pay for the
realization that the problems tormenting Slovakia were of an internal nature, and could only be
resolved through a slow and peaceful process of economic hardship and social insecurity.
This essay is based on the Chapter 6 ("1998 Election and the Birth of the Citizen") of PhD Disertation The Rise and Fall of
Illiberal Democracy in Slovakia 1998-1998: An Analysis of Transformation in a Post-Communist Societydefended at Carleton
University in Ottawa, Canada.
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