The movement for European unity first took root in the early postwar years, largely among centrist politicians in France, Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries. There were two motivating elements in the early period. One was a strong desire to end forever the century of military combats between France and Germany. The second was a sentiment of anti-Communism and the desire to establish a military force to oppose what was seen as a Soviet thrust to expansion westward in Europe. Both these motives served U.S. interests and the movement therefore got strong support from the U.S. government.

Because of the strong anti-Communist intentions, the movement was strongly oppposed by western European Communist parties and various small left wing parties outside of the orbit of the Social-Democratic parties, who were strong supporters of the movement. In general, conservative parties supported the movement as well because of its anti-Communist tonality and because of U.S. support, although there was occasional nationalist resistance to the idea of an eventual federal union.

We've come a long way from the situation of the 1950's in Europe. The first change was that, with the "success" of early economic cooperation, the Europe that originally counted six countries decided it should expand. Expansion was a welcome idea in the three southern European countries of Spain, Portugal, and Greece, which all shared two characteristics. They were emerging from dictatorships in the 1960's and thought that integration into Europe would ensure the maintenance of a more liberal political structure. Also, they were all relatively poor and thought that entry into Europe would serve their economic "modernization" well and generally raise their standards of living. These two results were in fact accomplished for these three countries, who are today (along with Italy) the unqualified enthusiasts of Europe.

Europe also sought to expand northwards to include Great Britain, Ireland, the three Nordic countries, and Finland. Of these six, only Ireland and Finland have been enthusiastic - Ireland for the same economic motivations as the southern European countries and with the same economic consequences, and Finland in part for economic reasons and in part to consecrate their de-linking from a post-Soviet Russia. Great Britain was always reserved toward Europe, particularly so about half of the Conservative Party, the Thatcherite wing. There were two reasons for this. One was old-fashioned nationalism. Why should the U.K. throw in its lot with the dubious French, the formerly antagonistic Germans, and the backward Mediterraneans?

The second reason however was less avowed. The United States had lost its enthusiasm for a united Europe. It was beginning to see Europe as a rival rather than as a satellite. And while the official line of the U.S. has to this day remained pro-European unity, the unofficial line was consierable coolness, especially any suggestion of an independent and unified European military force.

Since the Second World War, the British have flaunted their "special relationship" with the U.S. It seemed their last hold on the imperial glory that had become so tarnished. And the "special nature" of the relationship was that the U.S. and the U.K. worked more closely together on geopolitical issues (and indeed on military ones) than either did with France or Germany. The Thatcherites did not want to give this up by way of an apparently complete integration into Europe.

It was indeed his awareness of this British attitude that led General de Gaulle for a long time to oppose the British link to Europe: he saw Great Britain as the United States' Trojan horse within Europe. The evolution of de Gaulle's own views about Europe, and consequently those of the Gaullists in France, is important to note. De Gaulle was anti-Communist to be sure but also deeply suspicious of the U.S. and anxious to include Russia (though not Communism) into the geopolitical arrangements. Therefore, the idea of a U.S.-endorsed anti-Russian Europe was initially anathema. However, he was also convinced that Franco-German reconciliation was the keystone to restoring France's role in the world-system. He further understood that a strong western Europe would not serve U.S. interests in the long run. He understood this better in the 1960's than did the U.S. authorities. So he warmed up to the idea of his kind of Europe and was wary of a British entry into the European family for precisely that reason.

The story in the Nordic countries was rather different. There was opposition on the right and on the left. The right was opposed for the usual reasons - nationalism, fear of migrants, contempt for southern Europe. But the left (or parts of it) have been opposed for quite different reasons. Europe, they said, would be an imperialism power vis-a-vis the Third World. Scandinavia, they said, was at least Social Democratic. A united Europe might be more fiscally conservative and threaten the welfare state; and Europe is insufficiently democratic. The last charge is obviously valid, but the solution is clearly to increase federal unification which would create a normal elected executive and thereby overcome the "democratic deficit." Finally, there is a hidden racism, a sense of moral superiority vis-a-vis the continental Europeans.

One last word on expansions. Since 1989, there has been discussion of expansion eastwards into ex-Communist East-Central Europe. In general, these countries have two incentives to want to be included. The first is the economic motivation that led to the South European enthusiasm. The second, however, is a final rejection of Russia and their own cultural and political assertion as Westerners. The second reason leads them to want to be close both to Western Europe and the United States. Both sets of motivations arouse wariness in Western Europe. Western Europe is not sure it wants to foot the financial bill of including these countries. It is also not sure it wants to include a group who will restrain it from advancing toward political independence from the United States.

Where are we today? The European Customs Union has been achieved, uniting 15 countries. European Monetary Union has united 12 of these countries. It was this step that Denmark, one of the 15, refused to take in this latest vote on joining the euro. The so-called Schengen Agreement united a smaller group, permitting free movement across these countries' mutual borders. The putative European army unites an even smaller group yet. A serious move to political federation is not on the short-term horizon. It would probably have to be preceded by a military agreement. In any case, political federation would probably have to face the idea of advancing without Northern Europe.

So for the moment, the U.S. is spared the creation of a serious geopolitical rival, actually primarily thanks to the voting patterns of parts of the Nordic left, ironically the most anti-American parts. They have provided the crucial margin of votes to keep Denmark, Norway, and Sweden from taking the plunge into Europe that would bring them in line with France, Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries - the original six and still the heartland of the movement.

Published 2001-02-12